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*Author for correspondence (alex.kacelnik@zoo.ox.ac.uk).
Empathy, the capacity to recognize and share feel-
ings experienced by another individual, is an
important trait in humans, but is not the same as
pro-sociality, the tendency to behave so as to
benefit another individual. Given the importance
of understanding empathy’s evolutionary emer-
gence, it is unsurprising that many studies
attempt to find evidence for it in other species. To
address the question of what should constitute evi-
dence for empathy, we offer a critical comparison
of two recent studies of rescuing behaviour that
report similar phenomena but are interpreted
very differently by their authors. In one of the
studies, rescue behaviour in rats was interpreted
as providing evidence for empathy, whereas in the
other, rescue behaviour in ants was interpreted
without reference to sharing of emotions. Evidence
for empathy requires showing that actor individ-
uals possess a representation of the receiver’s
emotional state and are driven by the psychological
goal of improving its wellbeing. Proving psycho-
logical goal-directedness by current standards
involves goal-devaluation and causal sensitivity
protocols, which, in our view, have not been
implemented in available publications. Empathy
has profound significance not only for cognitive
and behavioural sciences but also for philosophy
and ethics and, in our view, remains unproven
outside humans.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The evidence for empathy in animals has been equiv-
ocal despite repeated attempts to investigate this
topic in several species [1–4]. The issue is interesting,
because while pro-social behaviour is widespread and
uncontroversial as a phenomenon (emphatically so in
eusocial organisms), empathy as a proximate mechan-
ism requires that the agent relies on a cognitive or
emotional representation of someone else’s internal
state, similar to several assumptions required to ascribeElectronic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1098/rsbl.2012.0554 or via http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org.
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would be a remarkable breakthrough both for our
understanding of animal cognition and of empathy’s
evolutionary emergence.
Two recent papers [5,6] report similar demon-
strations of pro-social behaviour in non-humans, but
the claims for their value as evidence for empathy are
profoundly different and can serve to scaffold the
debate. Our reflections are meant to go beyond
the analysis of these papers to touch on matters that
are at the core of current debates in the field and
should be of interest to students of behaviour and
cognition from multiple disciplines.2. RECENT CLAIMS
In both papers, one animal, the victim, is forcefully
restrained by the experimenters, leading one or more
other conspecifics to perform behaviour apparently
designed to release it. This pro-social behaviour is sen-
sitive to circumstances such as the bond between agent
and victim, and probably the presence of stress in the
latter. Inspired by previous observations of rescue
behaviour in ants [7], Nowbahari et al. [5] tested
whether such pro-social behaviour was preferentially
directed to kin. They found that Cataglyphis cursor
ants will release active (non-anaesthetized) nest-mates
restrained by a nylon snare in a sand field, but not
(i) anaesthetized nest-mates, (ii) C. cursor ants from
different colonies, (iii) sympatric unrelated species, or
(iv) prey items. Importantly, these authors refrained
from speculating about the psychological motivation
of their subjects, focusing instead on the functional
significance of such kin-favouring behaviour.
In the second study, Bartal et al. [6] used a prep-
aration conceptually similar to that of Nowbahari et al.
[5] to study pro-social behaviour in rats. They report
that rats will open a restrainer to free an apparently dis-
tressed cagemate, but will not open either empty or
neutral object-containing restrainers. This behaviour
was interpreted as ‘providing strong evidence for bio-
logical roots of empathically motivated helping
behavior’ [6, p. 1427] similar, or even homologous, to
that of humans.
In spite of the obvious species differences, the be-
havioural patterns exhibited by the ants and rats in
these two studies—i.e. initial frenzy of the actor(s) fol-
lowed by pulling on the legs/tail of the victim and
directed biting at the restraint—are very similar, but
nonetheless led to quite different interpretations
(links to video footage of these behaviours are available
in the electronic supplementary material). These con-
trasting approaches to similar findings in two distant
taxa reflect an ongoing tension in the field of compara-
tive cognition that may reflect different standards in
the interpretation of evidence: under what conditions
should we postulate unobservable mental states as
causes of behaviour? Bartal et al. [6] argue that the
most parsimonious interpretation for the rescue behav-
iour observed in rats is that they possess ‘the ability to
understand and actively respond to the affective state
of a conspecific’ [6, p. 1430]. This second set of
authors is accompanied by many others in their readi-
ness to make claims about animals’ mental states (cf.
[8,9]). The ability to actively respond to a conspecific’s
state is uncontroversial, and clearly shared with theThis journal is q 2012 The Royal Society
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state that acts as causal factor and that this involves
the actor’s understanding of affective state are a
different matter. In fact, the extent to which the obser-
vations provide evidence of ‘actions that are intended
to benefit another’ [6, p. 1427] requires some unpack-
ing. The word intended could be read functionally, as
being designed by natural selection to benefit another, or
psychologically, as being goal-directed towards acting on
the actor’s internal representation of the receiver’s wellbeing.
In the former, adaptive design, interpretation is
justified because both ants and rats can obtain
reproductive benefits by helping group mates who, in
nature, are likely to be genetically related. Even if
rats in a group were not genetically closer than
random, survival of group mates must bring evolution-
ary benefits; why live in a group otherwise? However,
the claim that individuals are driven by the psycho-
logical goal of improving a groupmate’s wellbeing
is unjustified in both species. Proving that any behav-
iour is psychologically goal-directed requires more
stringent tests.3. CRITERIA FOR GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOUR
The problem of intentionality in comparative cognition
is difficult to tackle and should thus be approached
carefully. The issue is isomorphic to that of design in
biology: does manifest design require an intentional
designer? Or in the case of rescue behaviour: does
apparent intention require an intentional agent? The
difference between the two questions is that, while
manifest biological design definitely does not require a
designer, apparent intentionality may, under certain cir-
cumstances, result from an intentional agent, an agent
that is truly goal-directed in the psychological sense.
For this reason, whereas intentionality in the action of
evolution is acceptable when used as a communicatory
shortcut, behavioural intentionality in the psychological
sense should not be invoked in explanatory accounts
unless goal-directedness is unambiguously proven. In
both cases, purpose is a fair target for explanation, or
explanandum. As an explanation itself, or explanans
[10], however, purpose is never justified in evolution
and only after careful analysis (and even this is
debatable) in psychology.
Dickinson and co-workers [11,12] put forward two
criteria for determining whether or not a particular be-
haviour is psychologically goal-directed. First, the
behaviour must be sensitive to the current status of
the outcome. If the outcome is no longer a goal (e.g.
because it was somehow devalued by a manipulation
of the state of the actor or victim), the behaviour
should decline. Second, the response must be instru-
mental in obtaining the goal; that is, a causal
relationship between the response and the presupposed
goal must be shown.
For purposes of illustration, let us hypothesize that
the rescue behaviour of ants and rats is indeed
designed to reduce the victim’s distress and that this
behaviour comes about because the target animals
‘understand and actively respond to the affective state
of a conspecific’ [6, p. 1430]. How can we prove
such a claim?Biol. Lett. (2012)First, we ought to provide an operational definition
of ‘understanding’. Second, we would need to show
that the occurrence of rescue behaviour adapts dyna-
mically to the incentive value of the presupposed
goal. If, at some moment, there is no discrepancy
between the goal and the current state of affairs, no
empathically motivated behaviour should be observed.
This means, for instance, showing that rescue attempts
do not occur when the victims are trapped, but show
no signs of distress.
Third, and crucially, it has to be shown that the
rescue behaviour is psychologically directed towards
the goal of reducing the victim’s distress. In other
words, the behaviour shown in the presence of a
stressed group mate should be sensitive to the causal
relation between the response and the goal. If, for
instance, the wellbeing of the victims were to be
increased by moving away from them—which is pre-
cisely the opposite of what both ants and rats actually
do—actors should modify their actions accordingly.
Without such proofs, claims for empathy remain
unpersuasive. Finally, in many of the preparations used
to study pro-social behaviour, the goal of improving the
victims’ wellbeing is confounded with the reinforcing
effect of terminating stress signals. Acting to make
one’s own or another subject’s stress signals cease can
be psychologically selfish and does not require empathic
interpretations. For instance, human parents may feed a
crying infant because their brains are primed to experi-
ence suffering as a response to infants’ screaming,
regardless of whether they understand or share the feel-
ings of the baby. The debate is still in progress in the
field of human psychology [13,14]. Our view is that
specially designed protocols are needed to distinguish
between the alternative goals, including manipulations
in which rescuing releases the victim but does not
terminate the stress signals, and vice versa.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that much of the
present discussion applies to non-rescuing behaviour,
of which a very pertinent example is the existence of
pedagogy, namely a tendency to teach. This behaviour,
a form of communication that helps receivers to learn,
occurs in a variety of species, including humans, apes,
meerkats, ants and babblers [15–20]. Nonetheless, it
is widely accepted that the connection between the
phenomenon and theory of mind is problematic, to
say the least, and need not reflect the same (if any)
level of empathic experience across taxa. Teaching as
a functional category does not require the attribution
of mental states and may in fact be sustained by differ-
ent proximate mechanisms in different species [21].
The available evidence suggests that teaching has
evolved independently in many taxa, challenging the
hypothesis that it requires elaborate cognitive feats
such as the attribution of mental states to others—a
very contentious topic by itself [22].4. CONCLUSIONS
The adaptiveness of pro-social behaviour is relatively
well understood in terms of the direct and indirect
reproductive benefits that such behaviour brings to the
‘benefactor’, but pinpointing the proximate mechanisms
underlying such behaviour has been a challenging
912 M. Vasconcelos et al. Opinion piece. Pro-sociality without empathyendeavour. Empathy has been proposed as a candidate
motivational mechanism [1,6], but such proposals
deserve careful scrutiny because the field of comparative
cognition is particularly vulnerable to unwarranted
anthropomorphic interpretations. Many human-like
complex abilities in animals have been shown to arise
from simpler mechanisms than previously hypothesized
[23], hence any claims of empathically motivated
behaviour should be taken cautiously.
Empathy is an important problem with profound sig-
nificance for cognitive and behavioural sciences and
even for philosophy and ethics. Any solid evidence for
empathy in non-humans would be a notable advance
but, in our view, it remains unproven outside humans.
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